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I have contended for some years that the principal economic problem facing commercial
agriculture is instability (Tweeten 1989, p.30).  Instability potentially threatens not only farmers’
financial viability but also consumers’ food security, given the desire for stable food
consumption in the face of production destabilized by man and nature.
Some observers expect instability to be a more pressing food security problem because of
global farm policy liberalization (see Johnston and Schertz, p.24; for an alternative view see
Collins and Glauber).  Trade policy and farm commodity policy are inextricably linked.  This
paper recognizes that both types of policies are causes and cures for economic instability.
The paper begins with an examination of the contribution of two key variables, yields and
exports, to economic volatility in agriculture that could influence the need for commodity
program stabilization policies.  Trends in annual yield volatility give clues whether changing
technology is affecting food system stability over time.  The second section of the paper
quantifies sources of food system variability in the United States.  Emphasis is on the role of
exports as a stabilizer or destabilizer of that system.
Finally, the paper expands its scope to examine instability and public policy
considerations within the new paradigm for American agriculture which I have outlined in
another  paper  with Carl  Zulauf  (Tweeten  and Zulauf).   The concluding section  raises serious
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concerns over consequences of political pressure for higher commodity loan rates and for crop
and revenue insurance programs featuring larger public income transfers from taxpayers to
farmers.
Are Yields Becoming More Unstable?
The major source of annual food production volatility is yields.  Nations may be less
willing to depend on markets to cope with risk if yield volatility is rising due to high-yielding
varieties, monoculture relying on a narrow range of genetic stock, extension of crops to marginal
lands, global warming, or El Niño and La Niña cycles.  The hypothesis that high-yielding
varieties display relatively greater yield variability was rejected in an earlier study by Hazell
(1985).  Later, he (1993, p.42) concluded, however, that yields have become more variable and
more correlated among regions.  Correlated yields arose from common genetic stock in high-
yielding varieties, similar widespread management practices used to improve yields, and
production narrowed to a few crops.
On the other hand, conventional and bioengineered breeding has produced drought, pest,
disease, and frost resistant varieties expected to help stabilize crop yields.  Whether forces for
stabilization offset forces for volatility is an empirical question.
Figures 1 and 2 provide clues.  US corn yields shown in Figure 1a have been more
volatile since 1980 than in the 1950s and 1960s as measured by standard deviations (in percent)
from five-year centered average yields.  Standard deviations since 1980 have been similar to
those of decades prior to the 1950s, however.  Thus the stability of yields in the 1950s and 1960s
rather than the volatility of yields in recent years appears to be exceptional.3
Source: FAO
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World coarse grain yields were available only since 1961, but show no patterns of rising
variation in recent years (Figure 1b).  Major deviations occurred in 1983 and 1988 mainly due to
drought in the United States which is the major global coarse grain producer.
US wheat yield variation has been less since 1980 than in previous decades with the
exception of the 1960s and 1970s (Figure 2a).  At the global level shown in Figure 2b, wheat
yield variation seems to be declining, with the decline most pronounced compared to the 1970s.
FAO data indicate that annual global aggregate food production is remarkably stable,
with a coefficient of variation from trend of approximately 1 percent--a number that has not
varied much over several decades.  Thus open trade to extend this global stability to individual
countries can go far to mediate the need for stable food consumption in every country in the face
of unstable annual food production.  More open trade may compensate in part for falling global
commodity stocks in recent years especially because of reforms in US and EU agricultural
policies.
1  Many view open trade as economically destabilizing and a threat to food security.
This issue is addressed for the US in the next section.
Contribution of Farm Exports to US Agricultural Industry Instability
Expected commodity stock carryout may be the best single predictor of commodity price,
hence variation in stocks explain variation in commodity prices.  Sources of requirements for
buffer stocks indicate origins of instability in agricultural markets.  Of particular interest is the
contribution of exports to market instability.
1Although there is little evidence that public management of commodity stocks or trade can be
more efficient than private market stockholding and trade management in meeting needs of
people for food and other goods, some may desire an emergency food reserve such as the 4
million ton US government grain reserve maintained to respond mainly to emergency food needs
in developing countries.6
The contributions of farm production (O), domestic utilization (D), and net US farm
exports (X)  to instability  are quantified  for the  nation’s total  agriculture  and  for  feed  grain,
soybean, and wheat markets in Tables 1 and 2.  Changes in buffer stocks (R) of commodity i are
defined as
Ri = Oi – Di – Xi.( 1 )
Estimated variance in buffer stocks S





2(Xi) – 2S(Oi·Di) – 2S(Oi·Xi) + 2S(Di·Xi). (2)
A high S
2(Ri) indicates an unstable system requiring substantial buffer stock (at
considerable cost) for stability.  The hypothesis that exports destabilize agriculture can be tested
from empirical expressions of equation (2).  Exports (X) are stabilizing if they increase to offset
increased supply (production, O) or reduced domestic utilization (D), other things equal.  On the
other hand, exports are destabilizing (require more buffer stocks for stability) if increasing
exports are associated with lower production or higher domestic utilization.  If exports are
unrelated to domestic production and utilization so S(Oi·Xi) and S(Di·Xi) are zero, then the
contribution of exports to the need for buffer stocks is simply S
2(Xi), the estimated variance of
exports.  The role of markets in mediating the impact on stock requirements from changing
exports and production cannot be fully defined in one equation, hence equation 2 is only a
simplified depiction of the market stabilization process.
Clues to the role of exports in stabilizing US consumption can be gleaned from the
simple correlation between exports and production.  A positive correlation coefficient between
exports and production indicated by the negative covariance term –2S(Oi·Xi) in 16 of the 20
scenarios presented in Tables 1 and 2 suggests that on the whole exports helped to stabilize
consumption in the face of unstable production, other things equal.7
Of the three components (O, D, X) of system instability considered in Tables 1 and 2, the
greatest relative instability as measured by the coefficient of variation comes from exports with
exceptions only for wheat in 1970-79 and 1990-98.  Because exports are small relative to
domestic production and utilization, however, absolute direct variation as measured by estimated
variance Si
2 was least for exports for all cases and time periods except for US aggregate markets
in 1980-96, for feed grains in 1970-79, for soybeans in 1980-89, and for wheat in 1950-69 and
1980-89.
Interactions between production, utilization, and exports apparent in covariances offset
much of the direct contribution of O, D, and X to instability.  Hence the estimated variances in
buffer stocks in all instances in Tables 1 and 2 are well below the sum of the direct variances Si
2.
Much of the reduction in system variation from interactions resulted from the preponderance of
negative covariances between production and domestic utilization S
2(Oi·Di) which probably
traces to the tendency for high production to generate low prices and high consumption.
To further gauge the contribution of exports versus domestic production and utilization to
system instability, the estimated variance of buffer stocks was divided into a component for
exports [S
2(Xi) -2S(Oi·Xi) + 2S(Di·Xi)] and all other sources [S
2(Oi) + S
2(Di)-2S(Oi·Di)].  The
results shown in the last two rows of Table 1 and 2 indicate that 61 percent of the system
variation measured by S
2(Ri) came from exports for the US aggregate farm economy in the
1950-59 period, and 59 percent of wheat system variability came from exports in the 1960-69
period.  For all other periods and crops (18 out of 20 cases), most or all of the system net
variation as measured by S
2(Ri) arose from domestic production and utilization.
2
2 It is not possible to precisely separate variation in Xi from Oi and Di due to interactions.  For
example, shifting the terms – 2S(Oi·Xi) and +2S(Di·Xi) from exports to “all other sources”
would have changed the numbers in the text.8
Statistically Appropriate Stocks
The calculations in Tables 1 and 2 also give insights into statistically appropriate buffer
stock requirements over time--which may rise if exports or other variables become more volatile.
Volatility as quantified by S
2(Ri) increased in aggregate from $5 billion in 1950-59 to $38 billion
(1982 dollars) in 1980-89 due mainly to production and utilization variability.  For all items
shown in Tables 1 and 2, S
2(Ri) was greatest since 1980.
Two standard deviations (2S(Ri)) of buffer stockholdings presumably avoid a shortfall of
stocks to protect against high utilization or exports and/or low production except one out of 50
years, assuming a normal distribution, constant economic structure, and market separability.
Another standard deviation is added to cover pipeline stocks necessary for markets to function
aside from seasonal and buffer stocks.  This calculation indicates that statistically appropriate US
stocks in 1990-98 for this arbitrarily specified level of food security were 82 million metric tons
of feed grains, 527 million bushels of soybeans, and 1,041 million bushels of wheat (Tables 1
and 2).  While these stocks were absolutely higher than in most previous periods, they were not
necessarily higher as a proportion of the mean utilization.  The later relative value was especially
high for feed grains in the 1980-89 decade (107 percent) and for wheat (nearly 100 percent) for
the 1980-89 and 1990-98 periods.  The percentage was only 9 percent for aggregate agriculture
in the 1970s despite the sharp rise in exports.
While numbers varied among the individual commodities in Tables 1 and 2, a consistent
pattern of variability in stock requirement related to trade is not apparent.  The most notable
conclusion is that most system variability traces to production and domestic use rather than to
exports.9
Economically Appropriate Stocks
The data in Tables 1 and 2 suggest statistically appropriate buffer stock levels to avoid
shortages 49 out of 50 years, ceteris paribus, but of greater interest is economically appropriate
stock levels.  Studies by Makki et al. (1996; forthcoming) of efficient wheat markets provide
several conclusions:
1. Under the most reasonable ranges of real interest rates and coefficients of variation in
exports and utilization, the economically optimal US carryout of wheat is approximately
400 million bushels--150 million bushels of buffer stocks and 250 million bushels of
pipeline stocks.  These carryouts are below numbers presented in Table 2 and below
actual average carryouts in recent decades which have been inflated by government
holdings.  Thus market liberalization in farm policy embodied in the Federal Agricultural
Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 can indeed be expected to bring lower
carryovers and may bring greater variation in grain prices.
2. Optimal US wheat carryout stocks and domestic consumption increase modestly with
unilateral and multilateral liberalization of wheat markets including a $.50 per bushel
reduction in Export Enhancement Program (EEP) payments.  Exports fell because the
EEP subsidy ended.  A direct payment was estimated to be more cost effective than EEP
to raise farm income.
3. According to results of the efficient market model employed by Makki et al. (1996),
storage and trade offer tradeoffs in smoothing domestic prices and consumption in
response to domestic and foreign supply variation attending a more market oriented
agriculture.  Rational market agents store more and export less when production10
uncertainty increases, and store less and export more when production uncertainty
decreases.
4. An optimal balance of two principal buffers--stocks and trade--in a country depends
partly on its share of world markets.  The small country optimally relies on trade, holding
only enough stocks to last until imports arrive when local production falls short.  Large
“countries” such as the European Union and the United States optimally rely more on
buffer stocks.  Models show optimal buffer stocks increase as the share of international
production variability of the large country increases (Makki et al.,  forthcoming, Figure
4).
5. The US and EU gain from more open markets even after accounting for the possible need
for more buffer stocks with trade liberalization in wheat.  Gains to taxpayers and
consumers more than offset losses to producers so that annual overall economic gains to
the US were $394 million and to the EU were $357 million with multilateral
liberalization versus 1989-93 policies (Makki et al., 1996, p.887).
6. Each 1 percentage point increase in the interest (discount) rate reduces optimal buffer
stock approximately 11 percent (Makki et al., forthcoming, Table 3).  Thus the public
sector with a real discount rate on capital of approximately 3 percent has a lower storage
cost and price volatility and a higher optimal buffer stock than the private sector which
had a discount rate of 7 percent.
7. Tyers and Anderson estimate that trade liberalization would reduce the coefficient of
international price variation for dairy products to 7 percent from 16 percent and for wheat
to 30 percent from 45 percent.  Although trade liberalization made possible by the FAIR11
Act offers opportunities to reduce volatility of world prices, lower government stocks and
set asides may raise domestic price volatility.
8. Developing countries do not necessarily fare well with liberalization of US and EU
policies.  The US and EU have provided less developed countries (LDCs) with very
cheap grain.  However, market liberalization providing higher prices to LDC grain
producers coupled with liberal access to global markets for many farm and nonfarm
products of developing countries could compensate LDCs for losses to consumers.
In  concluding  this section, I  note that  the United  States bore an  inordinate share of the
cost of world food market stabilization prior to 1996 (see Sharples and Martinez, p.18), a cost it
no longer seems willing to bear.  Because of high incremental costs of stabilizing food
consumption and prices, complete stabilization of the food economy is not economically
justifiable for either the public sector or private sector.  The drop in world grain stocks in recent
years has generated fears of global food crises under more market oriented agricultural policies.
However, it is notable that the most recent world food crises came in 1966-67 and 1972-73 when
government interventions were massive.  Although reserves and stabilization may be less under
the 1996 FAIR Act than under earlier policies, markets may be doing a more efficient job of
stabilization—“bending” but not “breaking” into a world food crisis.  The situation needs to be
monitored for possible improvements, but there is no compelling need to stall trade and farm
commodity program liberalization on the grounds that rising yield volatility and freer trade pose
food security risks.12
The Foundation for New Farm Program Directions
This section examines directions for new farm programs in an unstable world.  Before
turning to program provisions, however, I review 10 salient characteristics of the American
agricultural economy that will influence trade, stability, and policy.  They provide a foundation
for commodity policy conclusions presented later.
1. Farm exports will continue to expand but at a highly uneven rate. Conclusions from
foregoing sections are that volatile yields and exports need not deter efforts for market
liberalization.  Indeed, more open trade and technological advances raising crop yields
can help to stabilize the economy and food supplies.
With domestic markets for food growing about 1 percent annually and farm
productivity growing 1.5-2.0 percent annually, the nation’s agricultural plant perennially
would have to be scaled back with trauma without export market expansion.  Despite
advantages for trade, America often treats trade with impunity and illogic.  We perceive
exports as good and imports as bad.  If fact it is imports that raise our living standards;
exports are only the means to earn foreign exchange for purchasing imports.  The
nation’s frequent action against countries that “dump” their products in this country
below their domestic full production costs is teaching the world a counterproductive
lesson that denies low cost imports to our consumers and denies markets to our
producers.  That is, wide adoption and use by foreign countries of our dumping policies
will cause them to reject our farm products which for sound economic reasons often are
exported by us below the full cost of production.  The big losers from trade barriers are
the countries which practice them (Makki et al., 1994).  The US gains from multilateral13
and unilateral trade liberalization but producers gain most from multilateral
liberalization.
2. The global food supply-demand balance on average over the next 4 decades likely will
be more favorable for producers than over the previous 4 decades (Tweeten 1998).
Global crop and livestock yields were increasing considerably faster than aggregate
demand for food in the 1950s and 1960s.  Now yields are increasing at about the same
rate as population.  I and Carl Zulauf (p.265) contend that the old agricultural policy
paradigm of a US farming sector beset by technological change in excess of its ability to
adjust has been replaced by a new paradigm recognizing that agriculture can adjust to
technological change although annual and cyclical shocks will be painful.  Of course,
farm productivity gains will continue from science and technology.  But few excess
resources remain in farming despite the 1998-99 slump in grain and hog prices.  The
technological treadmill won’t stop, but producers can adjust to it.
3. The principal economic problem of commercial farmers will continue to be instability.
In response to continuing annual and cyclical instability, farmers will pursue private risk
aversion strategies such as flexibility, diversification, liquidity, insurance, buffer stocks,
contracting, and forward pricing.  The lines between input supply, farm production, and
marketing and processing firms will blur to reduce risk and increase efficiency.  For
example, when commodity supplies are unusually high, commodity producers often
experience low (or negative) profit margins while food processors and retailers
experience high profit margins.  Use of vertical coordination (contracts, integrated
ownership) to share returns reduces risk under such circumstances.14
Risk is not a prime facie case for government intervention or subsidies to
agriculture.  The nation does not subsidize risk takers in Las Vegas, the futures market,
Wall Street, or small businesses—the latter with higher failure rates than farmers.  Private
risk management strategies are effective for farmers.  In contrast, government subsidies
encourage excessive output and lower farm prices.  There is little or no evidence from at
home or abroad that risk can be better managed by the public sector than by the private
sector (see Reinsel; Wright and Hewitt).
The best argument for public stockholding and other risk management activities is
that private discount rates exceed public discount rates.  Hence the private sector
underinvests in stabilization effort, it is contended.  This contention holds for virtually all
goods and services, not just for risk management.  But international experience from the
former Soviet Union to New Zealand provides compelling evidence that widespread
public mismanagement of risk overshadows other considerations.  The weight of
experience is on the side of leaving risk management in private hands except for
information systems and other public goods.
4. Markets for farm commodities work (are efficient).  Because they are rival,
exclusionary, and transparent, farm commodities are market goods, most efficiently
allocated by markets than by government (for definitions see Tweeten 1989, p.56).
Markets work for more than just risk management.  On average, competent commercial
farm operators in the 21
st century likely will earn returns as high as elsewhere with or
without income support programs for crops and livestock.  The best evidence for that
conclusion is the past economic and technological success of commercial farms that are
reasonably well managed (Tweeten 1989, ch.4).15
The farming industry is not a welfare case.  To be sure, a few limited resource
farm families need public assistance.  But commodity programs are of little help to
operators of small farms (the majority of all farms) because they have little to sell and
payments are tied to past production.  Commodity programs won’t help long-term net
farm income because benefits are capitalized into land and lost to renters and new
landowners.  Commodity programs help retain family farms in the short run but not in the
long run (Tweeten 1993).
5. Farms will become more “industrialized”.  They will be larger, more vertically
coordinated, more challenging to manage and finance, and more high-tech with precision
inputs used to produce designer outputs (Boehlje).  The public and Congress will be less
supportive of income transfers to an “industrialized”, financially robust agriculture over
time.  This contrasts with  1998 when a budget surplus, election year, and partisan
politics strongly favored intervention to supplement farm income.
6. Most farms will be family farms and they will deal with ever fewer and larger input
supply and marketing conglomerates, some of which will be cooperatives.  Larger farms
will evolve from economies of size, efforts to countervail large agribusinesses, and the
need for close coordination of production at all levels to assure quality food tailored and
timed to meet discriminating consumer demands.
Agribusiness conglomerates will innovate rapidly and have substantial bargaining
power, but that does not mean low returns for farm resources or low prices for farm
products.  Even if private agribusiness input supplies were monopolists (they are not, and
many are coops) and even if private firms buying commodities from farmers were
monopsonists (they also are not, and many are coops), still farm resources would not earn16
low returns if their resources are mobile as they certainly are!  Agribusiness
conglomerates and contractors must pay producers a return that brings forth needed
supplies.  Of course, competition must be fostered--an “ounce” of competition can be
worth a “pound” of regulation.
7. Noncommercial farms will decline in numbers and share of output.  Commodity
programs tied to farm production will not save small farms--only off-farm income will.
The mid-size farm is at risk when it is too small to achieve economies of size and too
large to allow the operator to spend much time earning off-farm income.  Rather than
providing costly government payments to all producers, government can cut costs of
saving farms at risk by targeting assistance to them through credit programs, for example.
8. One threat to family farms is cash flow.  Operators who must sink savings into
refinancing a farm economic unit (over $2 million of assets) each generation will
continue to “live poor and die rich.”  Cash flow requirements to service debt can leave
operators with little income to pay family living expenses.
Leasing, contracting, and integration as well as help from parents are essential for
operators to enter and survive on a family farm.  Industrywide government transfers can
aggravate the cash flow problem by raising land values and hence the debt burden for
entrants.
9. Pressure by the public for government regulation of agriculture will increase.
Nonpoint chemicals and large livestock farms will be targets.
Farmers will share decisions not only with bankers, input suppliers, and
marketing firms, but also with bureaucrats.  However, producers can turn some public
environmental concerns to their advantage.  Carbon sequestration payments to reduce17
global warming can supplement farm income, build organic matter, save soil, improve
water quality and nutrient release, and raise yields (Tweeten et al., 1999).
10. There are no decoupled payments.  Government payments cannot be decoupled from
production because farmers are short of capital and use payments to purchase fertilizer,
machinery, and other inputs that raise output.  Government transfer payments to
producers are likely to continue for income support and insurance, creating excessive
output and low commodity prices.  I return to this issue later.
New Policy Directions
The foregoing background provides a prism from which to review proposed changes in
the 1996 FAIR Act.  Critical reform issues include whether to raise loan rates, restructure
insurance, and continue transfer payments.
Insurance Reform
            Political pressures are mounting to use revenue insurance as a vehicle to channel
larger government payments to farmers.  Larry Combest, chairman of the US House Agriculture
Committee stated in February 1999 that “I think basically we have to scrap the current program,
the way we have thought about crop insurance, and completely rebuild it…we have to get away
from the idea that crop insurance has to be actuarially sound, …you’ve got to have a revenue
enhancement feature in it” (see Maixner, p.36).  Shortcomings of that course of action are
evident.
Farmers don’t seem to be very risk averse.  Their outlook is optimistic; most prefer to
self-insure and don’t buy crop insurance unless it is heavily subsidized (see Gardner, p.37).
Farmers and the private sector are clever at devising and using private risk management tools.18
One of the most widely used is off-farm income.  Producers will buy private fire and hail
insurance but the world offers no evidence that rich or poor farmers will pay the full cost of all-
risk insurance.  The federal contribution to crop insurance, historically about one-third of cost,
has doubled in recent years.  Yet, dissatisfaction with the programs remains high among
producers and taxpayers.
A high income supplement (subsidy) component in insurance is likely to incur disfavor
with the World Trade Organization (WTO) because it is a coupled payment.  A high income
supplement component encourages production generally but especially in switch regions versus
core regions.  Often these switch areas are environmentally fragile as well as economically
marginal.  Some are best suited for grass or trees.  Maintaining production in uneconomic switch
regions drives prices down for producers in core areas and reduces national income because costs
to taxpayers exceed gains to producers and consumers.
Crop and revenue insurance feature quite uniform premiums over all risk situations,
creating an attractive moral hazard: Able operators who manage so as to avoid losses reject
programs while less careful managers insure and collect payments.  The government gets more
of what it pays for--unstable yields and revenues.
Another issue is what to insure: yields, prices, revenue, production costs, net farm
income, or total net income of farm people from all farm and off-farm sources?  Farmers face a
bewildering array of insurance choices.
Much can be said for a program such as the Canadian Net Income Stabilization Account
(NISA).  Begun in 1991, NISA supplements yield insurance.  In Canada, a farmer can contribute
up to 2 percent of eligible sales up to $250,000 per farmer matched by the government and can
make unmatched contributions up to 20 percent of sales (little used).  Farmers are allowed to19
accumulate up to 150 percent of the 5-year average of eligible sales.  Accounts (in local banks or
a Consolidated Revenue Fund) earn the market interest rate plus 3 percentage points, the latter
from the government.  Withdrawals are allowed when net farm income falls below the five year
average or a low-income threshold.  A farmer may withdraw all accumulated funds to drop the
program or retire.
Advantages of NISA are that it covers net farm income and hence all crops and livestock.
It is cost effective because it is carefully targeted: net income variation is reduced at low
Treasury cost per acre.  The program in the US would operate much like an Individual
Retirement Account (IRA).  It is relatively easy to administer; it could be operated at low
administrative cost by the Internal Revenue Service.  A pilot Adjusted Gross Revenue insurance
plan currently uses the IRS schedule F information to insure farm gross revenue.  Program
parameters can be adjusted to keep taxpayer costs as low as deemed appropriate by Congress.
Disadvantages of NISA are that it is
•   Regressive.  A producer with no income to accumulate an account receives no
subsidy.
3
•   Prone to give out in a run of bad years.  With no pooling, a producer’s fund may be
exhausted quickly.
•   Of no protection for beginning farmers before they have built a fund.
•   Of little help to cash flow.  American farmers have grown accustomed to advance
deficiency or transition payments.
3 Creative accounting such as widespread underreporting of income and generous tax deductions
allowed to the self-employed can result in much lower taxable income than real economic
income (Tweeten 1993, pp.30, 31).  The result could be seeming inconsistency as operators with
no taxable net income add to their stabilization account.20
•   Ties up financial capital needed to purchase farm production inputs.
•   Not cognizant of off-farm income which could offset low farm income.
•   Subject, like other government insurance, to abuse through creative accounting if
proper administrative oversight is lacking.
Many of these shortcomings could be corrected while retaining the advantages of insurance
covering income of farm people from farm and off-farm sources.
Loan Rates
A second major change proposed in the 1996 farm bill is to raise commodity loan rates.
Several considerations suggest that political pressures to raise rates be resisted.
Current loan rates encourage excess production which drives down commodity prices and
creates pressure for public supply management, stock accumulation, and export subsidies.
Operators find it advantageous to produce a crop if marginal (measured by variable costs in the
short run) production costs are covered.  Loan rates exceeded variable production expenses in
1996 and 1997 for every commodity in Table 3.  The loan rate was especially high relative to
variable expenses for soybeans, and planted acres expanded 13 percent from 1996 to 1998.  The
high loan rates distort market signals, discourage economic adjustments in resource use, skew
the commodity mix, and raise loan deficiency payment and market loan costs.
Even loan rates set below free market equilibrium price or the cost of production create
distortions.  Setting the loan rate at the normal market clearing price or average cost of
production pe causes expected market price to rise from pe to pl (Figure 3).  The average or
expected price pe when the entire “normal” distribution of possible prices is considered in Figure
3 is raised to p1--the average or expected price when the shaded portion of the normal
distribution is removed by a loan rate set at pe. Thus cutting off the lower tail of the market price21
Crop Loan rate Variable expenses
a Total economic cost
b
Commodity Year Loan rates Variable expenses
a Total economic costs
b
Corn ($/bu.) 1996 1.89 1.22 2.76
1997 1.89 1.23 2.69
Soybeans ($/bu.) 1996 4.97 2.16 6.30
1997 5.26 1.88 5.61
Wheat ($/bu.) 1996 2.58 2.31 5.94
1997 2.58 1.96 5.02
Cotton (¢/lb.) 1996 52 51 85
1997 52 48 80
Rice ($/cwt.) 1996 6.50 6.11 11.06
1997 6.50 6.28 11.70
Source: USDA, (Sept. 1998, pp.57-61).
aVariable expenses include seed, fertilizer, chemicals, fuel, repairs, hired labor, purchased irrigation
   water, etc.
bAll costs, including overhead and land.
Probability
of pricei
0 pe Pricei p1
Expected price
with no loan floor
Expected price
with loan floor at pe
Figure 3. Illustration of impact of the loan rate on price expectations.
Table 3. Loan rates, variable expenses, and total economic costs of production for major crops, US,
1996 and 1997.22
distribution with loan rates set at pe not only raises the expected price from pe to pl, but also raises
output and depresses market price.  Loan rates tied to production costs of average producers also inflate
supports because most production occurs below (unweighted) average costs of production--larger
producers on average have lower unit costs.
A high safety net encourages continuation of excessive production and delays economic
recovery in the farming industry.  The general rule is that low returns attend low risk as illustrated by














The economic impact of loan rates set above marginal costs in Table 3 is illustrated in
Figure 4.  Given the short-run supply S and demand D for commodity q, welfare gains in
monetary value from the loan support rate pl bringing market quantity qm and price pm compared
to free market equilibrium price pe and quantity qe are:
Figure 4. Impact of loan rates set at pl above the open market clearing price pe, giving a new
market price pm and loan deficiency payment of pl-pm per unit of output.23
Income Transfers
As indicated earlier, it is difficult to build a case for government subsidized insurance or
any other perennial income transfers to farmers to address economic instability.  Output is
expanded, commodity prices are reduced, and transfers are from poorer taxpayers to wealthy
farmers.  Any net economic benefits are bid into land prices.  If politics dictates that transfers
must occur, careful targeting of specific help such as credit to small family farms at financial risk
is more cost effective than across-the-board payments.
If transfers are a political necessity, it is well to consider continuing transition payments
decoupled from production but coupled to environmental practices.  Payments for carbon
sequestration could be spread widely among producers because virtually any crop producer can
build soil organic matter, thereby holding carbon in crops and soils rather than in greenhouse gas
(CO2) contributing to global warming.  Elsewhere I have summarized studies showing that
payments for carbon sequestration cannot be justified by the value of reducing global warming
alone but must be justified by complementarity with benefits such as less soil erosion, better
water quality, and improved water holding capacity and nutrient release (Tweeten et al., 1999).
Concluding Comments
This paper makes the case that basic food production instability from yield variation has
not increased and that exports can help to stabilize markets.  Markets work for farm commodities
and for risk management if given the opportunity.  Widespread subsidies to producers when farm
Area (value)
      Gain to:  Producers      a
          Consumers      c
          Taxpayers          -a-b-c
          Society                  -b24
prices fall can be counter-productive, retarding resource and commodity adjustments to markets
that would quickly return profitability to farmers.
I summarize by triaging agricultural commodity policy alternatives for an unstable
agricultural economy into three categories: rejected or “blue box” programs, acceptable or
“green box” programs, and questionable or “amber box” programs.
WTO Illegal, “Blue Box”, and/or Congressionally Rejected Programs
Because  of  opposition  from the World  Trade  Organization  or  because  Congress  is
unlikely to turn back the 1996 FAIR Act, the following programs show little promise of success:
1. Supply management (set aside) programs.
2. Price supports or guaranteed price above cost-of-production in a coupled
deficiency payment and target price program.
3. Dumping commodities abroad through large export subsidies under the Export
Enhancement Program.
4. Government stock accumulation.
WTO Legal or “Green Box” Programs
Other programs are more widely acceptable because they have favorable economic
payoffs or are not deemed to interfere much with trade.  Examples include:
1. Science: Research, education, extension, information systems
2. Grades and standards
3. Exports: Promotion (Market Access Program), low interest loans and guarantees
(GSM), food aid (PL480)
4. Environmental protection (CRP, EQIP, Wetlands Reserve, technical assistance)
5. Infrastructure investment (ports, rail, roads, etc.)
6. Sanitary-phytosanitary (SPS) restrictions based on science25
7. FAIR Act
•   Production Flexibility Contract (Transition) Payments
•   Loan rates--if set low enough
8. Disaster assistance
9. Insurance programs with only nominal subsidy
Repeated attempts to replace disaster assistance for all time with government subsidized
crop or revenue insurance have failed.  Hence a wise course of action may be to keep the subsidy
component of insurance programs as low as possible while recognizing that ad hoc disaster
assistance is likely to continue.  Such a policy is probably less resource-use distorting than
reliance on large insurance subsidies--the latter program likely to be either vigorously opposed
by competing exporters or (worse yet) adopted by them.
“Amber” Programs—Worthy of caution and perhaps to be Negotiated in
              WTO 1999+Round
Several emerging policies were not necessarily anticipated in the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations or the FAIR Act but are of growing concern, especially to trading
partners or competitors, and need to be addressed by Congress and in trade negotiations:
1.   Loan or price supports above market or world prices, especially in the absence of
production control.
2.   Yield or revenue insurance, disaster assistance, or export assistance programs
with sizable subsidy components.
Risk and environmental problems in agriculture will not go away; addressing these
problems begins with use of private markets and public “green box” activities listed above.  This
paper makes the case that loan rates (especially for soybeans) usefully could be lowered rather
than raised, that risk insurance could usefully be replaced by insurance of net income of farm26
operators from all sources including crops, livestock, and off-farm income in an IRA type fund,
and that transition payments be continued (if at all) based on carbon sequestration and other
environmental goals of value to the public.
Lawyers’ maxim that “tough cases make bad law” applies also to economics.  The tough
economic times in 1998-99 for farm grain and hog producers are traumatic for some but are no
surprise, given the history of commodity cycles endemic to agriculture.  Farmers had come off
three of their best years in history, and most were positioned to weather setbacks.  The setback
could not be blamed on the 1996 farm bill--hogs were not covered in previous farm bills and
grain prices were low partly due to less US exports to Asia.  A useful response would be
temporary credit or cash assistance only to at-risk producers.
Proposals for more permanent economic cures such as higher loan rates and income transfers
through risk insurance are likely to “make the patient worse”.  American insistence on exemption
of agricultural trade from the discipline of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade opened
the gates to a flood of foreign interventions especially by the European Union that continue to
stifle our farm exports. A federal government venture into heavily subsidized loan rates and
revenue insurance could be equally ill-fated.  Other nations could contest such ventures in the
WTO.  Or other nations will emulate our actions with serious consequences for our farm exports.
Even in the unlikely case that our competitors would not learn from our behavior, the result of
higher loan rates and income transfers through revenue insurance is likely to be excessive output
and low farm prices and incomes leading in turn to government stock accumulation, acreage set
asides (or an expanded Conservation Reserve Program to curb output), and large export
subsidies.  Thus history would repeat itself with the return to agricultural policies that originated
in the 1930s but are an anachronism for the 21
st century.27
REFERENCES
Ash, Mark, George Douvelis, Jaime Castaneda, and Nancy Morgan.  April 1995.  Oilseeds:
Background for 1995 Farm Legislation.  Agricultural Economic Report Number 715.
Washington, DC: Economic Research Service, USDA.
Boehlje, Michael.  First Quarter 1996.  Industrialization of Agriculture: What are the
Implications?  Choices, pp. 30-33.
Collins, Keith and Joseph Glauber.  Second Quarter 1998.  Will Policy Changes Usher in a New
Era of Increased Agricultural Market Variability?  Choices, pp. 26-29.
FAOSTAT Statistics Database.  http://apps.fao.org/
Gardner, B. L.  1994.  Crop Insurance in U.S. Farm Policy.  Chapter 2 in Darrell Hueth and
William Furtan, eds., Economics of Agricultural Crop Insurance: Theory and Evidence.
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Hazell, Peter.  1985.  Sources of Increased Variability in World Cereal Production since the
1960s.  Journal of Agricultural Economics 36:145-59.
Hazell, Peter.  1993.  Implications of Grain Trade Liberalization for LDC Food Security.
Chapter 3 in Robert Reinsel, ed., Managing Food Security in Unregulated Markets.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Hoffman, Linwood, A., Sara Schwartz, and Grace V. Chomo.  April 1995.  Wheat: Background
for 1995 Farm Legislation.  Agricultural Economic Report Number 712.  Washington,
DC: Economic Research Service, USDA.
Johnston, Warren and Lyle Schertz.  Second Quarter 1998.  What Farm Managers Told Us
about the 1996 Farm Act.  Choices, pp.21-25.28
Lin, William, Peter Riley, and Sam Evans.  April 1995.  Feed Grains: Background for 1995 Farm
Legislation.  Agricultural Economic Report Number 714.  Washington, DC: Economic
Research Service, USDA.
Makki, Shiva, Luther Tweeten, and James Gleckler.  1994.  Agricultural Trade Negotiations as a
Strategic Game.  Agricultural Economics 10:71-80.
Makki, Shiva, Luther Tweeten, and Mario Miranda.  November 1996.  Wheat Storage and Trade
in an Efficient Global Market.  American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78:879-890.
Makki, Shiva, Luther Tweeten, and Mario Miranda.  Forthcoming.  Storage-Trade Interactions
under Domestic and Foreign Production Uncertainty: Implications for Food Security.
Journal of Policy Modeling.
Maixner, Ed.  February 1999.  A strong voice and advocate, Ohio Farmer, pp.34-36.
Reinsel, Robert.  1993.  Managing Food Security in Unregulated Markets.  Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Sharples, Jerry and Steve Martinez.  April 1993.  The Role of Stocks in World Grain Market
Stability.  Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 248.  Washington, DC: Economic
Research Service, USDA.
Tweeten, Luther.  1989.  Farm Policy Analysis.  Boulder, CO: Westview.
Tweeten, Luther.  1993.  Government Commodity Program Impacts on Farm Numbers.  Chapter
13 in Arne Hallam, ed., Structure and the Changing Face of American Agriculture.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Tweeten, Luther.  1994.  Agricultural Risk Management in the 21
st Century.  Proceedings of
Summit on Risk Management in American Agriculture held at Washington DC.  Chicago:
Commodity Futures Trading Commission.29
Tweeten, Luther.  1994.  Epilogue.  Pp. 30, 31 in Countdown to 1995: Perspectives for a New
Farm Bill.  ESO 2122.  Columbus: Department of Agricultural Economics, Ohio State
University.
Tweeten, Luther.  1998.  Dodging a Malthusian Bullet in the Twenty-First Century.
Agribusiness: An International Journal 14(1):15-32.
Tweeten, Luther and Carl Zulauf.  Fall/Winter 1997.  Public Policy for Agriculture after
Commodity Programs.  Review of Agricultural Economics 19:263-280.
Tweeten, Luther, Brent Sohngen, and Jeff Hopkins.  1999 Forthcoming.  Assessing the
Economics of Carbon Sequestration in Agriculture.  Proceedings of Conference on
Assessment Methods for Soil Carbon Pools.  Columbus: Department of Agricultural,
Environmental, and Development Economics, Ohio State University.
Tyers, Rodney and Kym Anderson.  May 1998.  Liberalizing OECD Agricultural policies in the
Uruguay Round: Effects on Trade and Welfare.  Journal of Agricultural Economics
39:197-215.
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  September 1998.  Agricultural Income and Finance.  AIS-69.
Washington, DC: Economic Research Service, USDA.
USDA.  1999.  http://www.usda.gov/nass/pubs/agr98
Wright, B. D. and J. A. Hewitt.  1994.  All-Risk Crop Insurance: Lessons from Theory and
Experience.  Chapter 4 in Darrell Hueth and William Furtan, eds., Economics of
Agricultural Crop Insurance: Theory and Evidence.  Boston: Kluwer Academic
Publishers.Table 1. Components of Estimated Variance of Stocks of Aggregate Food, Feed, and Fiber and of Feed Grains 
for the United States by Selected Periods, 1950-1998.
U.S. Aggregate Feed Grains
Variance Source
a 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-96 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-96
------------------(Billion 1982 Dollars)------------------ ------------------(Million Metric Tons)------------------
S
2(Oi) 15.1 10.9 615.1 229.7 23.2 192.6 180.6 722.8 2097.6 1252.7
(CV, %)
b (6.0) (4.3) (35.0) (11.5) (3.9) (12.6) (9.5) (14.2) (18.1) (11.5)
S
2(Di) 16.6 23.4 358.0 65.2 27.7 76.6 71.4 159.9 276.9 132.5
(CV, %) (8.1) (7.8) (31.5) (8.2) (5.7) (8.7) (6.7) (8.8) (8.9) (5.0)
S
2(Xi) 3.0 1.4 28.5 68.3 5.1 8.3 15.9 223.3 121.9 46.8
(CV, %) (24.0) (9.5) (58.8) (51.8) (16.5) (41.3) (21.9) (33.9) (18.3) (12.5)
-2S(Oi  Di) -29.7 -29.4 -932.7 -200.4 -30.3 -218.4 -186.6 -390.4 -809.9 -533.4
-2S(Oi  Xi) -7.9 -4.2 -251.2 -200.2 -3.9 -78.5 -25.6 -693.3 353.8 -144.8
2S(Di  Xi) 8.0 4.9 186.7 75.4 -11.2 46.1 19.2 94.7 -94.4 -3.9
   S
2(Ri Total) 5.1 7.1 4.1 38.1 10.6 26.7 74.7 117.0 1946.0 750.1
   3S(Ri Total) 6.8 8.0 6.1 18.5 9.8 15.6 25.8 32.4 132.3 82.2
   Mean(Di+Xi) 57.2 74.9 69.6 57.3 41.1 107.4 144.4 188.5 124.0 142.7
   (3S/Mean, %) (11.8) (10.7) (8.7) (32.3) (23.7) (14.5) (17.9) (11.1) (106.7) (57.6)
S
2(Ri) share % to:
c
   Oi, Di 39 69 all all all all 87 all 80 all
     Xi 61 31 - - - - 13 - 20 -
Source: Basic data from U.S. Department of Agriculture.  See Tweeten (1983) for procedure.
a Buffer stock residual Ri = Oi (output) - Di (domestic use) - Xi (net exports) for commodity i.
b Coefficients of variation (CV) are standard deviations about the period mean as a percent of the period mean.
c Oi, Di share of total variance is S
2 (Oi) + S
2 (Di) -2S(Oi  Di); Xi share all other.
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